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Corruption is a persistent problem in several countries across Europe. Daniel Stockemer and Patricia
Calca write that corruption can have two distinct effects: it can either result in citizen disengagement
from the political process, or it can lead to increased voter participation as a mechanism for
punishing political authorities at the ballot box. Using an analysis of local level data in Portuguese
elections, they illustrate that the most corrupt areas in the country also had higher voter turnout
rates, suggesting that in Portugal, corruption acts as an incentive to participate in elections.
There is widespread evidence that political corruption, or the misuse of public office for private gain,
has negative influences on the economic and social well-being of countries. However, while plenty
of support can be found that bribery, money laundering and the exchange of money for personal
gain brings down investment and renders bureaucracies ineffective, it is less clear how citizens
react to corruption when they vote. Do enraged citizens rush to the polls to punish corrupt politicians
or do they become disgruntled and politically disengaged?
The existing dozen or so studies largely support the latter of the two propositions. They report that
corruption is negatively related to electoral turnout. However, research on the topic is still in its
infancy. In particular, almost all existing studies have a
national focus. They use national boundaries as their
level of analysis, thus overlooking significant intra-
country variation in both the independent variables and
the dependent variable of interest. Using Portugal, a
southern European country with a relatively large
corruption problem as a case study, we investigate the
corruption turnout nexus with local level data.
Portugal is the fourth most corrupt country in Western
Europe and also has among the lowest turnout rates of
western European states. While these national trends
make it unlikely that high national levels of corruption
are a mobilising agent for higher turnout, it is unclear if
the same relationship exists at the local level, where
arguably citizens are most strongly affected by
bureaucratic performance and efficacy. Certainly, it
might be that the more corrupt areas are, the more
citizens become disgruntled and the more likely they
are to stay at home on Election Day.
However, it might also be the case that citizens mobilise
more in areas with higher levels of corruption. For
example, individuals in the most corrupt parts of the country might suffer disproportionately because private
investment might go elsewhere and infrastructure projects might get delayed. Having a better off region as an
empirical referent might entice citizens in a more corrupt region to turn out in larger numbers, to ensure that their
local representatives are, at least, not more corrupt than the national average.
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Based on data from the 2005 and 2009 Portuguese elections, we test which of the two stipulations, if any, are true.
The number of corruption cases brought to court ranges from 0 to over 50 for Portugal’s municipalities in the two
years prior to Portugal’s legislative elections in 2005 and 2009. Due to the fact that the data is skewed towards
areas with zero or a few corruption cases, we created a categorical corruption variable and coded the 369 data
points with no corruption charges as 0, the 109 observations with one corruption case in the two years prior to the
election as 1, the 110 cases with 2 to 5 corruption cases as 2, and the 28 with more than 6 corruption cases in the
two years prior to either the 2005 or 2009 legislative election as 3. Turnout, the dependent variable, also varies
significantly. It ranges from 40 per cent for the municipality of Vila do Porto, to 74 per cent for the municipality of
Sardoal.
Table 1 displays the descriptive relationship between the categorical corruption variable and turnout, highlighting a
positive relationship between more corruption and higher turnout. These descriptive statistics indicate that turnout
increases by nearly 6 percentage points from less than 60 per cent for municipalities with no corruption cases, to
65.5 per cent for municipalities with 6 or more cases. This relationship is robust and confirmed in an LSD
comparison test and a multivariate regression model, in which we control for municipalities’ material affluence,
unemployment, the percentage of senior citizens, the closeness of the election and the district magnitude.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics measuring the relationship between corruption and turnout
Note: The Table illustrates that those areas with higher numbers of corruption cases also
experienced higher rates of voter turnout. For full calculations see the authors’ longer paper.
While our study clearly indicates that within Portugal highly corrupt areas have higher turnout than less corrupt
areas, our research has two caveats. First, we have no information on who the individual voters are and which
political figures have been indicted on corruption charges. Hence we cannot determine whether this increased
mobilisation strengthens the country’s democratic credentials. This would be the case if (more) individuals rush to
the polls to punish corrupt individuals and to clean up the country’s political system. In contrast, if higher mobilisation
comes from voters who have been bought off or promised government spending, then the country’s democratic
credentials could be severely harmed.
The second caveat in our study is that we cannot determine with certainty that the official corruption numbers
capture the actual presence of political corruption. There is the possibility that municipalities where more corruption
cases are reported are actually less corrupt, because citizens there bring corrupt officials to court. Vice versa,
regions with less corruption cases could actually be more corrupt, if everyone there accepts that politicians are paid
for favours and give out perks based on their clientelistic networks. However this scenario would imply that most or
all relevant actors participate in these corrupt practices, a scenario that is rather unlikely in today’s globalised and
Europeanised world.
For a longer discussion of this topic, see the authors’ recent paper in Crime, Law and Social Change
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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